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Ackerman: Protection of the Design of Useful Articles: Current Inadequacies

PROTECTION OF THE DESIGN OF USEFUL
ARTICLES: CURRENT INADEQUACIES AND
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
INTRODUCTION

The Constitution provides for the protection of "Writings and
Discoveries."' Two discrete statutory schemes have emerged to cover
these different types of works. Copyright law secures exclusive rights
in literary and artistic property,2 whereas patent law applies to items
of "invention." 3 Despite the broad range of creative products protected under these schemes, there remains a "twilight zone" of creative output that is inadequately protected by either system-the design of useful articles.
This note illuminates the policies underlying the legal protection
of literary, artistic, and inventive creations, and shows why protection should extend to the design of useful articles. It contrasts the
extent of protection provided by the copyright system with that of
the patent system and compares the amount of effort required to
trigger such protection on the part of an author with that of an inventor. The design of useful articles seems to fall in between these
systems, and hence is left largely unprotected. This note examines
the design area in an effort to develop a scheme of protection, and
thus rectify the current inadequacy in the law.
The case law that has developed around the statutory framework has failed to fill the gap left by the copyright and patent statutes.4 As first confronted n Mazer v. Stein,5 and later addressed in
1.

U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause gives Congress the power "[tlo promote the

Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.

2. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); infra notes 19, 21 and accompanying
text.
3.

35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976); see infra notes 18, 20-21, 50 and accompanying text.

4. This note focuses exclusively on federal copyright and patent protection. Common law
copyright protection for works that are fixed has become expressly preempted by the current

federal statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp. V 1981).
5. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). For a discussion of Mazer, see infra notes 114-32 and accompanying text.
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Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer' and Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By
Pearl, Inc.,7 the area of design protection has been treated by the
courts in confusing and often conflicting ways. Judicial interpretation
of the statutes-especially of the copyright statute-has not significantly clarified their meaning. The current statutory language has
proved to be an unworkable standard for consistent application. A
broader reading of the statutory language might provide greater consistency-essential to judicial determination of cases and to proper
guidance for the bar-while at the same time providing adequate
design protection. This note offers a construction of the existing statutory language to serve as a basis for future judicial resolution of the
current conflicting interpretations of the law.
Other statutory schemes have been proposed to protect designs
of useful articles not covered by copyright or patent law.8 The Senate passed a design bill at the time of the 1976 Copyright Act revision, but it was not adopted in the final version of the Act. 10 The bill
outlined a system of design protection, attempting to compensate for
the inadequacy of the copyright law in this area. This note demonstrates that the proposed legislative treatment of the problem would
have been an ineffective foundation for judicial interpretation, engendering further confusion and continued inadequate protection.11
Finally, this note proposes an alternative statutory solution to the
problem of inadequate design protection. The proposal is intended to
encourage the creation of designs by providing rights to protect
against commercial exploitation but.not extending those rights to the
6. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). For a discussion of
Esquire, see infra notes 133-73 and accompanying text.
7. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). For a discussion of Kieselstein-Cord, see infra notes
174-93 and accompanying text.
8. For a listing of past legislative proposals, see Hearings on H.R. 2223 Copyright Law
Revision Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1007 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]. H.R. 20, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); H.R. 4530, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979);
H.R. 2706, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) should be added to this listing to complete the subsequent history of this proposed legislation.
9. S. 22 tit. II, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 39
(1975) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. This note will refer to the most recent incarnation of the design bill, H.R. 20, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Design bill].
10. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of the reasons for its
omission in the final version of the Act, see H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50
[hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT], reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659, 5663.
11. See infra notes 261-67 and accompanying text.
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utilitarian features of the protected article.12 The proposed plan is a
hybrid of copyright and design patent law, 13 protecting those designs
that satisfy the threshold level of "originality" required by the copyright law 14 but not15the more stringent patent tests of "novelty" and
"non-obviousness." The proposal attempts to overcome the shortcomings of the design bill"6 by providing a framework amenable to
judicial application that will effectively protect the design of useful
articles.
COPYRIGHT VERSUS DESIGN PATENT PROTECTION

Purposes of Protection
Copyright law applies to "Authors" and their "Writings; ' 17 patent law applies to "Inventors" and their "Discoveries." 18 The fundamental purpose of copyright law-to encourage "the production of
literary [or artistic] works of lasting benefit to the world,"' 9 parallels
that of patent law-"to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. ' 20 To effectuate this common purpose, both systems provide
a financial incentive to authors and inventors in the form of a monopoly over their creation for a limited period of time.2 1 Design protection stems from a definition in the current copyright statute,22 and
from a separate chapter of the patent statute that serves to distinguish between design patents and utility patents.23 Design patent
protection seeks to "encourage ornamentation and beautification in
12.

The utilitarian features are within the scope of patent law. See 35 U.S.C. § 101

(1976).

13. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (1976), as amended by Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97247, § 16, 96 Stat. 317, 321 (design patent provisions).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. V 1981).
15. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1976).
16. See infra notes 262-81 and accompanying text.

17. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1951).
18.

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); see Federico, Commentary on the

New Patent Act, in 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 3 (1954).
19.

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (quoting Washingtonian Publishing Co. v.

Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)).
20. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942).
21.

See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (copyright case); Griffith Rubber Mills v. Hoffar, 313 F.2d 1, 3
(9th Cir. 1963) (patent case). The copyright or patent monopoly is considered "a fair return

for.

. .

creative labor." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).

22. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981) (definition of "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
23. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (1976), as amended by Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97247, § 16, 96 Stat. 317, 321 (Chapter 16-Designs).
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manufactured articles so as to increase their saleability and satisfy
the aesthetic sense of the purchaser. '2 4 Utility patents are addressed
to the workings of the articles themselves, protecting their functional, rather than aesthetic, qualities. 25
Differences Between Copyright and Design Patent Protection
Although both the copyright and patent systems offer design
protection, they exhibit marked differences in several respects. The
requirements for securing copyright protection differ from those for
obtaining a design patent. Additional hurdles exist on the path to a
design patent that are absent in the copyright scheme. Different bundles of rights inure to copyright and design patent owners. Along
with those rights comes the ability to prevent different types of infringing activity, depending upon the type of protection obtained.
In order to be eligible for copyright protection under the Copyright Act of 1976, a work must be an "original [work] of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression."26 The requirement of
"originality" can be satisfied by a minimum of independent 27 crea'
tive2 8 effort.2 9 It is, essentially, a "prohibition of actual copying. "30
An author can draw substantially from the works of others and still
receive copyright protection for his work as long as it varies distinthe author's exercise of
guishably 3 ' from those works and represents
32
his "own skill, labor, and judgment.
Artistic works protected by the copyright statute are not subject
to administrative or judicial examinations of their artistic merit or
aesthetic value. 33 This "nondiscrimination" principle, which prevents
24. Rains v. Cascade Indus., 269 F. Supp. 688, 693 (D.N.J. 1967) (citation omitted),
rev'd on other grounds, 402 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1968).
25. See Ropat Corp. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 535 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1976); Trimble Prods. Inc. v. W.T. Grant Co., 283 F. Supp. 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 404 F.2d 344 (2d
Cir. 1968).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. V 1981).
27. See 1 M. NiMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A], at 2-6 (1981).

28. While "creativity" and "originality" can be viewed as separate elements, such a distinction may be merely one of semantics. Id. § 2.01[B], at 2-13.
29.

L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429

U.S. 857 (1976) (the mere translation of a work of art in the public domain into a different
medium does not satisfy the originality requirement).
30. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951)
(footnote omitted).
31. Strong similarities between two works can establish copying. See Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
32. Dorsey v. Old Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 873 (10th Cir. 1938).
33. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
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favoring one art form over another, 34 stems from both the policy of
protecting all forms of creative output and the perceived judicial incompetence in making artistic evaluations.3 5 The objective viewpoint
this principle demands must be adhered to when analyzing
copyrightability issues, but it is often consumed by more subjective
considerations. 6
One category of "works of authorship" protected by the statute
is that of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works." 3 7 This category
is defined to include the "form" of "works of artistic craftsmanship,"38 and the "design of a useful article." 39 To be eligible for
copyright protection, a design of a useful article4" must contain "features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. ' 4a The
drafters of the Act culled this language from Copyright Office Regulations 42 in an effort to distinguish between copyrightable works of
applied art and uncopyrightable industrial designs.43 The design features of an industrial product must be capable of either physical or
conceptual 44 separation from its utilitarian aspects in order for them
to be given copyright protection. Case law fails to clarify the language of the statute and provides little guidance for applying the
34.

See id. at 250-51. In granting copyright protection to circus posters, the court stated:

"[T]he [copyright] act however construed, does not mean that ordinary posters are not good
enough to be considered within its scope." Id. at 251.
35. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
908 (1979); see Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).

36. This would occur where the individual analyzing copyrightability factored his own
personal tastes and preferences into the analysis. An aficionado of classical art, for example,
might be more inclined to uphold copyright protection for a classically designed useful article

than for one of modern, abstract design. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981).
38. Id. § 101 (definition of "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
39.

Id.

40.

A "useful article" is defined as "an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function."

Id.
41. Id. The legislative history of the Copyright Act explicitly incorporates the "nondiscrimination" principle for this category of work, stating: "[T]he definition of 'pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works' carries with it no implied criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic
value, or intrinsic quality." HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE & CONG. AD. NEws 5659, 5667. On the issue of judicial subjectivity in evaluating

works of applied art, see Note, Works of Applied Art: An Expansion of Copyright Protection,
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 241, 247-53 (1982).
42. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1975) (repealed 1978).
43. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 54-55, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5659, 5667-68.
44. Id. at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5668.
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statutory criteria.45
An article must meet more stringent requirements to qualify for
design patent protection, and for patent protection in general, than
for copyright protection. In addition to "originality," designs must
be "new . . . and ornamental, ' 48 and be embodied in an "article of
manufacture. 47 They must also satisfy the general patent tests of
novelty 48 and non-obviousness. 49 Protectable designs must rise to a
level of "invention" ' 0 beyond the requisite level of creativity required
for copyright protection.
Ornamentality of a design is adjudged from the standpoint of an
"ordinary observer."51 This criterion of design patentability is satisfied if the article exhibits rudimentary "aesthetic skill and artistic
conception. 52 Novelty exists when the article for which patent protection is sought has not been anticipated by another or by the inventor/designer of the article himself. 53 A patent will not be granted if
the article is found to have been anticipated.54
The test of non-obviousness compares the claimed design with
the prior art 55 from the point of view of one having "ordinary skill in
the art."56 The Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.57 developed a three-pronged approach to facilitate analysis of this issue:
first, a determination of the "scope and content of the prior art,"
second, identification of the differences between the claimed subject
matter and the prior art, and finally, a resolution of the "level of
45. See I M. NimMER, supra note 27, § 2.08[B], at 2-90; infra notes 133-200 and accompanying text.
46. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1976).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 102.
49. Id.§ 103.
50. "Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor . . . ." Id. § 171 (emphasis added).
51. See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871); Fields v. Schuyler,
472 F.2d 1304, 1305-06 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973).
52. See Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 696 (2d Cir.
1961).
53. See Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 494 F.2d 162, 164 (7th Cir. 1974); 35
U.S.C. § 102 (1976). "Anticipation" refers to the "disclosure in the prior art of a thing substantially identical with the claimed invention." Smith v. ACME General Corp., 614 F.2d
1086, 1088 n.6 (6th Cir. 1980); see Continental Oil Co. v. Cole, 634 F.2d 188, 195 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981); Popeil, 494 F.2d at 164.
54. See Smith v. ACME General Corp., 614 F.2d 1086, 1088 n.6 (6th Cir. 1980).
55. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
56. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
57. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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ordinary skill in the pertinent art. ' 8
Thus, works exhibiting ordinary skill may qualify for copyright
protection while not meeting the degree of uniqueness required for
design patent protection. 9 The extent of design patent protection,
however, greatly surpasses that of copyright protection. 0

Copyright protection for works created on or after January 1,
61
1978 lasts for the author's life plus an additional fifty years Copyright holders have the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute
copies of the work,6 2 to use the work as the basis for a derivative
work, 63 and, in the case of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,"
to display the work publicly. 4 The reproduction right in the case of
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" includes the right to

reproduce the work "in or on any kind of article."6 5 Copyright protection in such an article, however, does not include the right to

manufacture it,66 nor does the copyright extend to the utilitarian aspects of the article. 67 Pictures or photographs of such articles ap-

pearing in advertisements, "commentaries" or news reports would
not infringe the rights of the copyright holder.6 8
Infringement of copyright occurs upon violation of any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner. 9 The70article must be copied
without authority from the copyright owner.
58. Id. at 17.
59. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
60. See id. at 103.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. V 1981). Copyright protection in works made for hire,
id. § 101 (definition of "work made for hire"), lasts for "seventy-five years from the year of
[their] first publication, or. . .one hundred years from the year of [their] creation, whichever
expires first." Id. § 302(c).
62. Id. § 106(1), (3).
63. Id. § 106(2).
64. Id. § 106(5).
65. Id. § 113(a). This subsection of the statute adopts the holding of Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201 (1954). HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 105, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5720.

66.

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 105, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEws 5659, 5720; see 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (Supp. V 1981). Patent protection does include a
right of manufacture. See infra notes 72, 79 and accompanying text.
67. The statutory definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" provides for
their protection "insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 113(c) (Supp. V 1981). "Commentaries" refer to "feature stories about
the articles." HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 105, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5659, 5720.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. V 1981).
70. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954); Blumeraft of Pittsburgh v. Newman
Bros., 373 F.2d 905, 906 (6th Cir. 1967); 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 8.01[A], at 8-10.
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Design patents are granted for a term of fourteen years. 71 The

owner of a patent is afforded "the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention. 172 Thus, the patent confers a legal monopoly over the manufacture, use and sale of the invention7 1
for the duration of its term. 4 The extent of this monopoly is defined
by the specifications and claims of the patent. 75 A design patent pro-

tects the design of an article of manufacture. 76 Design patent protec-

tion does not extend to the functional aspects of the article, 77 but

only to its appearance.78
Patent infringement occurs upon unauthorized manufacture, use
or sale of a patented invention. 79 The specific test for design patent
infringement, as articulated in Gorham Co. v. White a" is:
if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if
the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing
him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.8"
The design patent need not be copied to be infringed, since even in-

dependent creation of an article can infringe a patented design.

2

Access to the copyrighted work and substantial similarity between the potentially infringing
work and the copyrighted work are relevant factors in the determination of whether there has
been copying. See Blumcraft, 373 F.2d at 906-07; Comptone Co. v. Rayex Corp., 251 F.2d
487, 488 (2d Cir. 1958); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1976), as amended by Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-247,
§ 16, 96 Stat. 317, 321.
72. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. IV 1980).
73. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969).
74. Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1010 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
75. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940); see 35 U.S.C. §
154 (Supp. IV 1980).
76. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1976).
77. See Barofsky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340, 344 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1031 (1969); infra text accompanying note 107.
78. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1871).
79. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1976).
80. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871).
81. Id. at 528.
82. A patent owner may prevent others from "making, using, or selling the [patented]
invention." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. IV 1980). Copying is not a requisite element of patent
infringement under the patent statute.
There are substantial differences between copyright and patent procedures which should
be noted. Copyright protection is secured upon fixation of the work, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp.
V 1981), maintained after publication by placing notice of copyright on the work, id. § 401(a),
and fully realized after deposit of copies and registration with the Copyright Office. Id. §§
407-412. There is no prior art search upon submission of a copyright application, as there is
under patent procedure. See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1976). The procedure for obtaining a patent is
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Articles Left Unprotected
While there is the potential for overlapping copyright and pat-

ent coverage for certain articles, 3 judicial application of the statutory design provisions has left a gap in the fabric of legal protection.
This gap can be attributed to the general reluctance of courts to

award copyright protection to the design of a useful article that approaches an industrial design,84 along with the difficulty of applying
the statutory tests of separability and independent existence of an
article's design features.8 5 These factors, coupled with the inherent

difficulty of obtaining a design patent, 6 and the minimal chance of
maintaining its validity once granted," leave the design of useful articles devoid of statutory protection. A brief survey of design cases in

both the copyright and design patent fields will illustrate the boundaries of protection set by the courts.88

Designs that have been held copyrightable include designs on
glassware, 89 dinnerware, 90 fabric, 91 jewelry designs,

box,93

2

the design of

doll. 94

Those that have
and that of a
an ornamental jewelry
been denied copyright protection include typeface designs,9 a watch
more complex, rigorous and time-consuming than that for a copyright. Its application must
include specifications, id. §§ 11I-112, and, where necessary, drawings of the claimed subject
matter, id. §§ 111, 113; models or specimens may also be required, id. § 114. The application
is then examined and a prior art search is conducted to determine the patentability of the
claimed design. Id. § 131.
83. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). Election of one form of coverage over
another is not required. See In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
84. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
908 (1979).

85. See infra text accompanying notes 206-14.
86. Obtaining a design patent is a time-consuming process and a potential deterrent to
the designer who, in order to capitalize on a legal, limited monopoly, must implement the
design while still in vogue. See Note, Protectionfor the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility,
72 HARV. L. REV. 1520, 1522 (1959); supra note 82.
87. See infra note 99.
88. For a more detailed and select case discussion, see infra notes 114-200 and accompanying text.
89. William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F. Supp. 264 (W.D.
Pa. 1951).
90. Syracuse China Corp. v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
91. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
92. Boucher v. Du Boves, Inc., 253 F.2d 948 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936
(1958); cf. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (belt
buckle designs copyrightable).
93. Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Gresco Jewelry Co., 204 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 308
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1962).
94. Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1955).
95. Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978).
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face,96 and a molded shoe bottom. 9 7 Copyright protection seems to

be granted to those designs that are "on" an article, and denied to
designs that serve a basically functional purpose. 8
Examining empirical data is one way of determining the effectiveness of design patents as a means of legal protection.99 Rather

than succumbing to the pitfalls of numerical analysis, 100 the following overview of the range of articles that have received design patent
protection is offered as an indication of the scope of this form of
protection.
Design patents have been granted to silverware, 10 ' pipes,10 2 and
a garment rack. 03 Pitchers, 0 4 pens, 0 5 and a tire tread' 06 have been
denied design patent protection. A distinction similar to that drawn
in the case of copyrights can be made here: If the design is fundamentally functional, it can only be protected, in that capacity, by a
96. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 155 F.
Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958).
97. SCOA Indus. v. Famolare, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
98. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994, 996 (2d Cir.
1980) (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
99. While approximately 7.8 thousand design patent applications were filed in 1980,
only 3.9 thousand design patents were issued. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,

1981, at 554 (102d ed. 1981) (table 945). Approximately 73%

of the design patents litigated since 1980 and discussed in reported cases have been held invalid. See Narda Microwave Corp. v. General Microwave Corp., 675 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1982)
(design patent held invalid); Contico Int'l, Inc. v. Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., Inc., 665
F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1981) (design patent held valid); Watts v. University of Delaware, 622
F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1980) (summary judgment of invalidity reversed); Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1980) (three separate design patents held invalid); Fiberglass In
Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, 216 U.S.P.Q. 1027 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (design patent held valid); C
& M Fiberglass Septic Tanks, Inc. v. T & N Fibergiass Mfg. Co., 214 U.S.P.Q. 159 (D.S.C.
1981) (design patent held invalid); Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp.
940 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (design patent held invalid); Kim Craftsmen, Ltd. v. Astra Prods., Inc.,
212 U.S.P.Q. 268 (D.N.J. 1980) (design patent held invalid); K-Jack Eng'g Co. v. Pete's
Newsrack, Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (design patent held invalid).
100. Mere recitation of the number of design patent applications compared with the
number of those granted may prove misleading in that denial of a design patent application
may turn on questions of invention, novelty and/or non-obviousness in addition to those of
patentability of a certain type of design. Copyright protection for designs, however, hinges
solely on the copyrightability of the design, making an examination of articles denied design
patents less useful than for copyrights.
101. International Silver Co. v. Pomerantz, 271 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1959).
102. Falcon Indus. v. R.S. Herbert Co., 128 F. Supp. 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
103. Sel-O-Rak Corp. v. Henry Hanger & Display Fixture Corp. of America, 159 F.
Supp. 769 (S.D. Fla. 1958), affid, 270 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1959).
104. Bliss v. Gotham Indus., 316 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1963).
105. Scripto, Inc. v. Ferber Corp., 163 F. Supp. 113 (D.N.J. 1958), affd, 267 F.2d 308
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864 (1959).
106. In re Bigelow, 194 F.2d 550 (C.C.P.A. 1952).
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utility patent.1"7
Desirabilityof Design Protection.-Legalprotection for designs
of useful articles is necessary to effectuate fully the purposes of the
constitutional provision which gives Congress the power to grant limited monopolies to "Authors and Inventors." 08 Encouragement of
the arts for public benefit is the fundamental goal of both the copyright and design patent statutes. 0 9 Although this need has been recognized, it has not been adequately realized through the application
of the statutes."
The creator of an aesthetically appealing design should be allowed to reap the benefits of his or her efforts, which will ultimately
serve the cause of public cultural advancement."' His or her designs
are no less worthy of legal protection than those which have been
traditionally granted copyrights or design patents. Unintelligible
standards"12 and rigorous requirements"13 should not bar protection
for the design of useful articles.
CASE LAW

CONFUSION

Mazer v. Stein
The Supreme Court's major foray into the field of legal protection of the design of useful articles occurred in Mazer v. Stein." 4 In
Mazer, the Court addressed the question of the copyrightability of
statuettes of human figures intended for use as lamp bases. Stein
created and molded these original statuettes and registered them as
"works of art" under the 1909 copyright law. The statuettes were
sold as such, but were marketed predominantly as lamp bases. Mazer copied these statuettes, embodied them in lamps, and sold the
107.

See Barofsky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340, 344 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. de-

nied, 393 U.S. 1031 (1969).
108.
109.
110.

8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 161.
See 1980 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. 150 (committee re-

111.
ports). After the expiration of the term of design protection, the work would fall into the

"public domain"-become available for the free use of the public.

112.

The definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" in § 101 of the Copy-

right Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981), is difficult to apply with any consistency. See

supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text; infra notes 178-263 and accompanying text.
113.

The requirements of novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976), and non-obviousness, id. §

103, demand a high level of uniqueness of design.
114. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The Court granted certiorari to resolve/a conflict between
lower court decisions based on nearly identical facts. Id. at 203.
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lamps without Stein's authorization.1 15 Stein sued Mazer for copyright infringement."' The district court dismissed the complaint, refusing to grant the design of the lamp copyright protection. 17 The
court of appeals reversed," 8 stating that Stein's use of the statuettes
in an article of manufacture did not affect his ability to protect the
statuette against infringement." 9
The Supreme Court held the statuettes to be copyrightable
"works of art," and upheld the validity of their registration despite
their subsequent use in a manufactured product. 20 The decision laid
the groundwork for the sections of the current statute that pertain to
this area of the law. 2 ' The Court sought to define the parameters of
protection for such "works of art" consistent with the goals of the
Copyright Act. Industrial use of an article was thus found not to
detract from its copyrightability. Protection extended to the right of
the creator of the statuettes to "prevent use of copies of [his] statuettes as such or as incorporated in some other article."' 22 This language indicates that both useful and nonuseful articles which copy a
protected design can be found to infringe the copyright. 2
In establishing guidelines for copyright protection, the Court in
Mazer held that "artistic articles are protected in 'form but not [in]
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects.' "124 The potential patentabil-

ity of the statuettes was held not to bar copyright protection.' 25
Overlapping copyright26 and design patent protection thus became a
very real possibility.1
The boundary between copyrightable works of "applied art"
and industrial designs not subject to copyright protection, as defined
115. Id. at 202-03.
116. Id. at 203, 204.
117. Stein v. Mazer, 111 F. Supp. 359, 364 (D. Md.), rev'd, 204 F.2d 472 (4th Cir.
1953), affd, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
118. Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472, 480 (4th Cir. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
119. 204 F.2d at 477.
120. 347 U.S. at 218.
121. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 54-55, 105, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5667-68, 5720. For a discussion of the relevant sections of the
current copyright statute, see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
122. 347 U.S. at 218.
123. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 105, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5659, 5720; 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 2.08[B], at 2-88.
124. 347 U.S. at 218 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949)).
125. Id. at 217.
126. Courts have since recognized overlapping coverage. See, e.g., In re Yardley, 493
F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
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in Mazer,127 has been incorporated into the current copyright statute. 12 Copyrightable "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include "works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects."' 12 9 The legislative history
specifically refers to the Mazer decision as providing for the protection of works of "applied art . . .embodied in useful articles, re-

gardless of factors such as mass production, commercial exploitation,
and the potential availability of design patent protection."' 130 The exclusive rights provided under the statute for "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works" echo the scope of protection outlined in Mazer by
affording the copyright owner reproduction rights in both useful and
nonuseful articles.' 3' Either kind of article can thus infringe a copyrighted work.
Mazer provides a framework for the development of the design
protection aspects of the current Copyright Act. Its principles, however, as codified in the Act, have generally been subject to narrow
construction. 3 2 The following cases demonstrate the difficulties in
applying the rules established in this area and the conflicting legal
interpretations that have resulted.
Esquire and Kieselstein-Cord-ConflictingResults
Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer.'3 -- The decision in Esquire concerned
the copyrightability of outdoor lighting fixtures. 34 Esquire attempted to register the designs of its elliptically-shaped, contemporary outdoor lighting fixtures with the Copyright Office as "works of
art."' 13 5 Its application was denied on the basis of a regulation which
required that the design exist independently of the useful functions
of the article. 136 Esquire then brought suit in district court 37 to com127. See 347 U.S. at 218. Industrial design refers to the mechanical or utilitarian aspects of an article.
128. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981).
129. Id.
130. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 54, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5659, 5667.
131. 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (Supp. V 1981). For a listing of the exceptions to these exclusive rights, see id. § 113(c) and supra text accompanying note 68.

132. See, e.g., Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 804-05 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (overall shape of lighting fixtures not copyrightable).

133.

591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).

134.

Id. at 798.

135. Id.
136. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1976) (repealed 1978). The current statute, 17 U.S.C.
101 (Supp. V 1981), adopts some of the language of this regulation.

137.

§

Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 796
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pel copyright registration for the design of its fixtures. That court,
basing its decision on Mazer,138 held for Esquire, stating that modern art forms are entitled to the same protection as traditional art.139
The circuit court evaluated the Register of Copyrights' interpretation of the regulation, as well as its application to the facts. 4 °
Giving the Register's interpretation considerable weight," 4 the
42
court denied Esquire copyright protection for its lighting fixtures.
The Register had construed the regulation to bar copyright protection for the overall shape of the fixtures, despite their aesthetic appeal. 143 This construction flowed from the Register's perception of
the congressional policy of denying copyright protection for industrial designs.1 44 The Register feared that extending such protection
would open the floodgates to most useful consumer products, which
are often characterized by "aesthetic considerations.' 45
The court relied on the legislative history 46 of the Copyright
Act of 1976147 for further support of the Register's decision. 14 It
cited the House Report as indicative of congressional intent to deny
copyright protection for the "overall design

. . .

of a utilitarian ob-

ject, even if it is determined by aesthetic as well as functional
considerations.' 49
The court distinguished Mazer because that case dealt with invalidation of the copyright registration resulting from industrial use
of a copyrighted article, while the Esquire issue hinged on initial
copyrightability of the overall shape of an article.'50
The court also dismissed the contention that to deny these designs copyright protection would improperly discriminate against
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
138. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
139. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939, 941-42 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d
796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
140. 591 F.2d at 799.
141. Id. at 801, 802.
142. Id. at 806.
143. Id. at 800.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 801; see Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd,
591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
146, HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659.
147, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981).
148. 591 F.2d at 803, 804.
149. Id. at 804 (citing HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5668).
150. See id. at 804-05.
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modern abstract sculpture in favor of more traditional forms.15
While conceding the "disproportionate impact" that the Register's
interpretation of the regulation placed upon abstract sculpture, the
court found this result to be unintentional and outweighed by the
congressional policy against copyright protection of industrial designs.1 5 2 Ultimately deferring to the discretion of the Register, the
court found her application of the regulation to the facts of the case
to be appropriate and reasonable. 53
The court skirted some crucial issues in assessing the decision of
the Register, and ignored more persuasive interpretations of the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions." Since the Register
recognized the aesthetic appeal of the fixtures, 55 and Mazer provides for copyright protection of design features despite an article's
utilitarian purpose, 1 6 it seems inconsistent that such protection
should be denied to the design of Esquire's fixtures based on fears of
unwarranted extension of copyright coverage to industrial designs. A
judicial doctrine of necessity1 57 could be applied to curb such an extension of protection. If the design of a useful article must be fashioned in a particular way to accomplish its utilitarian function, it
would not be afforded copyright protection. Industrial products that
offered no embellishment of these fundamental and necessary design
features would remain unprotected by the copyright statute. 58
The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976159 was an
inappropriate authority for the court to rely upon. In addition to the
fact that the effective date of the Act'6 0 renders it inapplicable to
Esquire, its provisions reflect significant changes in statutory and
regulatory language. The applicable regulation denies copyright pro151.
152.

Id. at 805.
Id.

153. Id. at 806.
154. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1976) (repealed 1978). The legislative history of the 1976
Act was improper authority. See infra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
155. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939, 940 (D.D.C. 1976), revd, 591 F.2d 796
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
156. 347 U.S. at 218.
157. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967)
(sweepstakes rules not copyrightable due to the limited forms of available expression).
158. Congress did not intend to extend copyright protection to industrial products as
such. See HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5659, 5668.
159. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5659.
160. The effective date of the Act was January 1, 1978. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2541, 2598.
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tection to an article if its "sole intrinsic function" 161 is utility, while
the 1976 Act provides an arguably broader definition of a "useful
article" as one with "an intrinsic utilitarian function."16e2 The court,
in what Professor Melville Nimmer terms a "neat bit of judicial legerdemain,"16 3 deemed the alteration in terminology a mere codification1 4 and took the liberty of applying the language of the 1976 Act
to deny the overall design of the fixtures copyright protection. 6 5 The
court should have applied the language of the regulation, however,
since it differed significantly from that of the 1976 Act. This would
have resulted in the granting of copyright protection to the overall
design of the fixtures, since utility was not their "sole intrinsic
function."166
Proper consideration of the legislative history, if pertinent,
should include a discussion of separating an article's functional and
design elements on a conceptual level, and then providing copyright
protection to those design aspects. In particular, the shape of an article should receive copyright protection upon meeting the conceptual
separateness requirement.1 67 The Esquire court chose to avoid such a
discussion, and instead relied on what it perceived to be the overall
tone of the legislative history. 68 The court should have focused on
the provision in the applicable regulation, 6 9 and examined the questions of separate identification and independent existence of design
161. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1976) (repealed 1978) (emphasis added).
162. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added); see I M. NIMMER, supra note
27, § 2.08[B], at 2-93, 2-94. Most useful articles have a utilitarian function, not serving as
their sole function. The Copyright Act definition thus narrows the range of copyright protection for articles in general because the "useful article" finding triggers the more difficult tests
of separability, not applied to nonuseful articles. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl,
Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980); see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text;
Infra notes 204-06.
163. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 2.08[B], at 2-92.
164. 591 F.2d at 803.
165. Id. at 804. See generally I M. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 2.08[B], at 2-89 to -94
(discussion of the limits of copyright protection to applied works of art).
166. The fixtures also serve to beautify the landscape.
167. See HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5659, 5668.
168. See 591 F.2d at 803-04. The court summarily dismissed the conceptual separability
concept and focused instead upon "the overall design or configuration of a utilitarian object."
Id. at 804.
169. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1976) (repealed 1978). This regulation permitted copyright
registration for "the shape of a utilitarian article [which] incorporates features. . . which can
be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art." Id. (emphasis added).
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features of the shape of the article'70 as copyrightable aspects of a
utilitarian article. It relied largely on policy considerations for its
decision,' 71 rather than employing them as just one relevant factor in
the determination of the case.
Finally, the court gave short shrift to the principle of "nondiscrimination"
articulated in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic
Co. 17 2 While recognizing the burden its decision would have on modern, abstract designs, it found that the congressional policy against
providing copyright protection for industrial designs counterbalanced
such a burden. Proper analysis would have tipped the balance toward copyright protection for the fixtures, because their design elements, although modern and abstract, are no more "industrial" than
those of more classical fixtures which are commonly given
protection.
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc.174 is a case,
which, as the court recognized, straddles the "razor's edge of copyright law."'' 7 5 It concerned the copyrightability of ornately sculptured belt buckles. The buckles were designed and hand-crafted by
Kieselstein-Cord and cast in gold and silver.' 78 Of the two designs
7
considered, one was registered under the Copyright Act of 1909,1
the other under the 1976 Act. 78 Pearl had admittedly copied the
designs,' 7 9 and was sued by Kieselstein-Cord for copyright infringement. 180 The district court granted Pearl's motion for summary judgment, "' holding both copyrights invalid for lack of "separability and
independent existence of the artistic features."' 8 2
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the district court by upholding the copyrights of the designs of the
170. See id.
171. The court cited the "congressional policy against copyrighting industrial designs."
591 F.2d at 800.
172. 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.

173. 591 F.2d at 805.
174.

632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).

175. Id. at 990.
176. Id.
177. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101810 (Supp. V 1981)).

178. 632 F.2d at 991.
179. Id.
180. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 732, 733 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).

181. 489 F. Supp. at 738.
182. Id. at 736.
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belt buckles.1 8 It held that the buckles' primarily ornamental nature
was conceptually separable from their secondary utilitarian function. 184 Relying on the legislative history of the 1976 Act, 8 5 the
court found the conceptual separateness notion not violative of congressional policy against copyright protection for industrial
designs.1 16
This case, along with Esquire,1 7 delineates the current judicial
boundaries of protection for the design of useful articles based on the
Copyright Act of 1976.188 Protection is afforded when an article's
design is of primary importance and denied when an article is primarily functional.119 The cases are irreconcilable, however, on the
issue of separability of design from utility. If the test of conceptual
separability had been applied to the lighting fixtures in Esquire, the
opposite result might have been reached. The overall shape of the
fixture can be described without considering its functional aspects,
such as wiring. The criterion of separate identification of design features would thus be met. Conceptual independent existence of the
overall design of the fixture is also conceivable if thought of in structural, rather than functional, terms. Similarly, if this test had not
been adopted by the Kieselstein-Cord court, it might have decided
not to grant protection to the belt buckle design because the design
was not physically separable from the functional aspects of the
article.
The cases also reach opposing conclusions as to the application
of the congressional policy against copyright protection for industrial
designs. 190 The Esquire court viewed it as an overriding factor, 9 1
whereas the Kieselstein-Cord court did not accord it as much
weight. 19 2 The Kieselstein-Cordcourt focused its inquiry instead on
183. 632 F.2d at 990, 994.
184. Id. at 993. Query whether this test, as articulated in the legislative history of the
1976 Act, should be applied to the buckle design registered before the effective date of the new
Act? Arguably it should, since it is primarily an analytical tool, rather than a fundamental
change in congressional policy.
185. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659.
186.
187.

632 F.2d at 993.
Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908

(1979).
188.

17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981).

189. See 632 F.2d at 993.
190. Compare 591 F.2d at 801 with 632 F.2d at 993.
191. See 591 F.2d at 800, 801.
192. See 632 F.2d at 993.
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the issue of separability, 193 the "industrial" nature of belt buckles
being less of an obstacle to copyright protection than that of the
lighting fixtures in Esquire.
A more recent consideration of the issue of copyright protection
for the design of useful articles occurred in the case of Gay Toys,
Inc. v. Buddy L Corp.9 That case concerned the validity of the
copyright of the design of a toy airplane. Buddy L designed the
plane to be both attractive and compact. It marketed the plane and
registered its design with the copyright office. 9 5 Gay Toys designed
and marketed a similar toy airplane. After being informed by Buddy
L that its plane infringed the Buddy L copyright, Gay Toys sought a
judgment declaring Buddy L's copyright invalid or, alternatively, not
infringed by its plane.1 98
The court, relying heavily on Esquire, held the design of Buddy
L's toy airplane not copyrightable, finding its design features incapable of separate identification and independent existence from the
utilitarian aspects of the plane. The court cited two aspects of utility:
the function of the toy to "let [a child's] imagination soar,"197 and
the function of the shape of the plane to allow more planes to be
shipped in less space. 198 The court also held the overall design to be
basically functional, because it required simulation of a real airplane.1 99 The shape and appearance of the plane were held to be
separately identifiable from its utility as a toy, but not from its utility as an economically packaged plane. Finally, the court found the
plane's sculptural features incapable of either physical or conceptual
independent existence from its utilitarian aspects as a toy and as an
economical package.2 00
Gay Toys provides no new significant insight to the problem of
interpreting and consistently applying the copyright statute. The
opinion cites the statutory language in conclusory terms, with little
analysis of the issues of separability of design from function. We are
193. See id. at 992-94.
194. 522 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
195. Id. at 624.
196. Id. at 623-24.
197. Id. at 625.

198. Id.
199. Id. The finding of design mandated by function could provide the basis for an argument of necessity of design as a bar to copyright protection. Query, though, whether the

plane's unique appearance--stubby wings and short fat body-was fashioned out of necessity?
See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.

200.

522 F. Supp. at 625.
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left with confusion and conflict between the circuits over the proper
mode of analysis.
PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT

The courts have failed to establish a consistent approach to the
analysis of the design issue. The boundary line of copyrightability
seems to have been drawn at the point where function predominates
over the aesthetics of an article, thus causing the article to fall into
the category of "industrial design"-suitable only for patent protection.201 Courts' use of the "industrial design" label as a convenient
tool to deny copyright protection to the overall shape of an article is
improper since overall shape is a design "feature" worthy of legal
protection as the product of creative effort. 202
The foundation for proper expansion of copyright coverage to
articles primarily functional but containing design aspects deserving
of protection lies in the copyright statute. Analytical guidelines for
application of the statutory tests are thus offered in an effort to provide a methodology geared toward adequate design protection that
does not exceed the area circumscribed by Congress.20 3
The article in question must first meet the threshold characterization as a "useful article," as defined in the Copyright Act.2 04 Such
an article may have a myriad of purposes incorporated into its design, but as long as one of them is utility, it falls into this
category. 0°
Having been properly characterized as "useful," the article
must then be subject to the crucial double-edged test of separate
identification and independent existence of the design features apart
from utilitarian aspects. 20 6 This seems to present the most analytical
difficulty of any of the prerequisites for design protection. When the
design sought to be protected is "on" the useful article, such as a
201. See supra notes 133-200 and accompanying text.
202. Hearings, supra note 8, at 1855-58 (statement of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights) (advocates the protection of three dimensional designs despite the fact that they
are incapable of physical separation from the article itself).
203. Copyright protection must not infringe on the domain of the patent system by covering an article's function through protecting the design of the article. See infra note 286 and
accompanying text; see also House REPORT, supra note 10, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5668.
204. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981).
205. See supra note 40; note 162 and accompanying text.
206. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
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design on a glass207 or a pattern printed on fabric, 20° it is not difficult
to identify it separately from the function of the article itself. This
involves description of the aesthetic aspect of a useful article without
describing its utility.209
The design features' capability to exist independently of the
utilitarian aspects of the article can be analyzed from either a physical or conceptual point of view. 21 0 Physical separability requires the
article's design features to remain intact after removal of its functional features.21 ' Professor Nimmer's example of a hood ornament
on an automobile is illustrative of this principle: remove the automobile and the ornament remans intact.212 The analysis becomes more
difficult when considering the shape or overall design of an article as
the subject of protection. 213 In this case, the design of the article
often embodies its functional features, making separate identification
and independent existence nearly impossible to realize from a physical standpoint. At this juncture, conceptual analysis 214 becomes vital.
While physically separating the overall design of an article may
leave little, if anything, of the object, its shape can clearly be visualized apart from those aspects that make it useful.
The standards developed for the analysis of design patents
might provide a useful framework for discussion of the overall design
separability issues in the area of copyright protection. Because design patents protect the article's appearance as a whole, 21 5 they are
analyzed from the point of view of an "ordinary observer"-specifically, the deceptive effect of two similar designs on
207.

See William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F. Supp. 264

(W.D. Pa. 1951).

208. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
209. 1 M. NIMmER, supra note 27, § 2.08[B], at 2-95. This is analogous to drafting a
design patent claiming only the design elements, not the functional features, of an article.
210. See id. at 2-95 to -96; see also HoUsE REPORT, supra note 10, at 55, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5668.
211. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 2.08 [B, at 2-95.
212.

Id.

213. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979), court wrongly perceived an absolute bar to copyright protection for the shape of useful
articles. The current statute, as specifically outlined in its legislative history, HousE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 55, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5668, expressly

provides for such copyrightability upon meeting the separability tests.
214. Such analysis was provided for by the legislative history. See HOUSE

REPORT,

supra note 10, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5668.

215. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1871); Hadco Prods., Inc. v.
Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1269 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972).
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such a person.210 Function does not factor into such a determination
since the articles compared have the same utilitarian purpose. Applying this principle to copyright analysis, the overall design of the
useful article emerges as a separate entity-its appearance as a
whole being the subject of protection.
Consider the application of this method of analysis to a water
faucet in the shape of a fish. It clearly satisfies the threshold characterization as a "useful article," performing the utilitarian function of
channelling water from pipes into a sink or bathtub. Separate identification of design features can be accomplished by describing the
"fishy" aspects of the faucet: its mouth, scales, fins, etc., as well as
overall shape. The utility of the faucet as a water conduit does not
enter this discussion. Independent existence of the design features
would be difficult to analyze from a physical standpoint-remove the
fish, and the faucet does not remain as such. Conceptual independent
existence, however, is analytically feasible: the fish design can exist
apart from its function as a faucet, even as a scaled-down piece of
jewelry. The ultimate conceptual separation would occur at the point
where the thinnest inner layer of metal tube from the inside of the
fish would suffice to perform the function of a water channel and the
remaining metal would encompass the design. Having passed the
statutory tests, the article would be entitled to copyright protection.
Under current case law analysis, the fish faucet would be
deemed primarily functional and thus considered an uncopyrightable
"industrial design.1 217 Physical and conceptual separation would not
be found, since overall design was .the "feature" under consideration.2 18 The proposed method of analysis expands the range of copyright protection as currently drawn by the courts to include articles
with the same characteristics as that of the faucet in the example
above.
As an ultimate check on the propriety of granting the design of
a useful article copyright protection, and to guard against unwarranted expansion of the copyright realm into that of industrial design, a rule of necessity could be applied.2 19 Such a rule would pro216. This test is used to determine infringement. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511,
528 (1871).
217. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
908 (1979).
218. Overall design has not been eligible for copyright protection. See, e.g., id. at 80405.
219.

For a discussion of such a rule, see Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d

675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967). Without this rule it would be difficult to limit the application of
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hibit copyright protection for the design of a useful article where the
article necessarily requires a particular design in order to perform its
function.22 0 In those cases, copyright of the design would, in effect,
extend to the function itself-an undesirable result since only the
patent system can protect functional features.2 21
This final test, as applied to the fish faucet example, is not an

obstacle to copyright protection. There are many ways a water faucet can be designed-it need not assume the figure of a fish to perform its function. Thus, granting copyright protection to the fish faucet will not prevent other people from designing faucets in other
ways nor from making faucets altogether.
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS

The Design Bill

At the time of the general copyright revision in 1976, the Senate passed its version of the bill222 which included a separate title to
provide legal protection for "ornamental designs of useful arti224
cles." 22 3 This portion of the bill was not approved by the House
and did not become part of the Copyright Act of 1976.225 This sec-

tion highlights the reasons for its failure, focusing on the potential
shortcomings of the design bill in providing adequate design protection, and proposes an alternate statutory scheme to provide such protection, consistent with the language of the Constitution. 26
Why the Design Bill Was Not Enacted.-Design bills have been
proposed in the past 227 but none have been enacted into law. 22 8 The
House Judiciary Committee deemed the design protection afforded
conceptual separateness, since most industrial designs would be amenable to such analysis.
220. See id.
221. Functional features must be protected by mechanical patents, as they exhibit "utility." See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) ("[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor ...
(emphasis added).
222. S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
223. Id. tit. II.
224. See H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5810, 5823; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 49-50, reprintedin
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5662-63.
225. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981).
226. See supra note 1.
227. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 49-50, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5659, 5662-63.
228. The Senate has passed design bills five times. Id. at 50, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG.

& AD. NEWS 5659, 5663.
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under Title II of the Senate bill229 to be a distinct form of protection,
outside the scope of the copyright revision bill.2 30 It called for more
hearings and reconsideration of design protection,, specifically to consider which agency would handle the administration of such
23 2
claims 231 and to discuss the special problem of typeface designs.
The committee also emphasized that the benefits of creating a new
monopoly would not outweigh the burden of removing designs from
233
free public use.
Scope of Protectionof the Design Bill.-Although a specific design protection bill has not been enacted, certain provisions of the
1976 Copyright Act 2 4 allow for such protection upon satisfying the
statutory criteria. 235 A comparison of the relevant provisions of the
most recently proposed design bill 236 and the 1976 Act will facilitate
an examination of the scope of protection afforded by the design bill.
In order to receive protection under the proposed bill, a design
must be "original" 237 and "ornamental, ' 238 but may not be "staple
or commonplace, 2 39 "dictated solely by a utilitarian function," 240 or
a three-dimensional feature of apparel. 241 The "originality" requirement parallels that of the Copyright Act,242 as interpreted by the
' 244
courts, 243 necessitating "independent creation [by] an author."
"Ornamentality" refers to the attractiveness or distinctive appear-

229.
230.

SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 39.
HoUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 50, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEws 5659, 5663.
231. The administration issue was raised despite the fact that the Copyright Office had
agreed to be the location of the Administrator. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 166.
232. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 50, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5663. Typeface designs are not currently copyrightable. See Eltra Corp. v.
Ringer, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978).
233. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 50, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5663.
234. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 113 (Supp. V 1981).
235. For a discussion of the statutory criteria for design protection, see supra notes 4658 and accompanying text.
236. Design bill, supra note 9. This bill tracks the language of the Senate bill.
237. Id. § 901(a). "Originality" is defined as "the independent creation of an author
who did not copy . . . from another source." Id. § 901(b)(4).
238. Id. § 901(a).
239. Id. § 902(b).
240. Id. § 902(d).
241.. Id. § 902(e).
242. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. V 1981).
243. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
244. Design bill, supra note 9, § 901(b)(4).
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ance of an article. 24 5 The separate identification and independent existence requirements of the copyright law246 find no parallel in the
design bill.2 47 The bill would merely prohibit designs "dictated
solely" by the utility of the article.2 48 This seems to allow for expansion of the range of designs capable of protection to cover those articles which are primarily functional, but still not "dictated solely" by
utilitarian concerns. This language might also be construed to accomplish the same purpose as a rule of necessity, as outlined
earlier.24 9
Protection under the design bill commences upon publication of
registration,250 whereas copyright protection under the 1976 Act
"subsists" from the time of fixation.2 51 The design bill provides for
loss of protection if the application for registration of the design is
not made within six months of the "publication" 252 of the design.2 53
The term of design protection is five years, plus an additional fiveyear renewal term, 2 " unlike copyright protection which lasts for fifty
years after the death of the "author."2 55
Infringing action under the design bill consists of copying the
protected work without the consent of the proprietor, 5 paralleling
the action prohibited under the Copyright Act.2 57 The design bill
prohibits the making, importing, selling, or distributing of such an
infringing article. 58 Similarly, a copyright proprietor can prohibit
unauthorized reproduction, sale, and distribution of copies of the
work, and has the exclusive right to display it publicly. 59 Pictures or
photographs of the design or article do not generally constitute in245.

Id. § 901(b)(3).

246. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981) (definition of "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works").
247. This omission makes design protection less cumbersome to analyze and, thus, easier
to maintain.
248. Design bill, supra note 9, § 902(d).
249. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
250. Design bill, supra note 9, § 904.
251. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. V 1981).
252. Design bill, supra note 9, § 909(b).
253. Id. § 909(a).
254. Id. § 905(a).
255. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. V 1981).
256. Design bill, supra note 9, § 908(d). A design is not infringed "without knowledge
of. . . [the] protected design." Id. § 908(b). Query whether this is the same as the "access"
factor discussed in cases of copyright infringement? See supra note 70.
257. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. V 1981).
258. Design bill, supra note 9, § 908(a).
259. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. V 1981).
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fringing activity under either the design bill or the Copyright Act. 260
Is the Design Bill Effective?-The concept of the design bill
furthers the constitutional goal of public betterment through private
reward of "Authors" for their "Writings. 2 1 How effectively it implements this goal is subject to question.
The most restrictive aspect of the design protection granted
under the proposed bill is its short duration. 6 2 The ten year maximum term 2 3 may not be a sufficiently long period of time to warrant
investing time and money in designing and marketing an article.
Thus, the ultimate public benefit under such a plan might not be
fully realized.
The design bill as proposed also might generate problems of interpretation, leaving this area of the law in its present state of confusion. The bill's denial of protection for designs "dictated solely" by
utility26 ' might be construed to apply to those articles that are primarily functional, aesthetic appearance being of secondary concern.
Denying legal protection to such designs would unjustifiably cut
short the range of designs that should be covered by the bill.2 65 A
more realistic construction of this language would permit design protection unless the article's function depended upon its particular appearance.2 8 Any design that would thus be "dictated solely" by the
utility of the article could only be protected under patent law, if at
7
all. 26
An Alternative Proposal
While similar in scope, and certainly in intent to the design
the proposal outlined in this section seeks to remedy the
shortcomings of the design bill by providing legislative guidelines for
bill,266

260. See 17 U.S.C. § 113(c) (Supp. V 1981); Design bill, supra note 9, § 908(d).
261. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
262. See 125 CONG. REc. E3045 (daily ed. June 19, 1979) (statement of Rep. Railsback); Program for Protection of Industrial Designs, 1980 A.B.A. SEc. PAT. TRADEMARK
COPYRIGHT L. 163 (suggests a ten-year term).

263.
264.
265.

Design bill, supra note 9, § 905(a).
Design bill, supra note 9, § 902(d).
Even the copyright law allows for protection of designs in this range, apart from

the utilitarian aspects of an article, which meet the statutory criteria. See 17 U.S.C. § 101

(definition of "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
266. This inquiry parallels that of the rule of necessity developed earlier in this note. See
supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
267.
268.

A patent would protect the "utility" of the article. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
Both the design bill, see SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 161, and this proposal

seek to foster the development of the decorative arts through reward of creative effort.
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designs that are subject to protection. Select portions of the design
bill are modified under this proposal (modifications appear in italic
type). The remaining sections of the bill are to be left intact.
PROTECTION OF THE DESIGN OF USEFUL ARTICLES

DESIGNS PROTECTED
SEC. 901. (a) The author or other proprietor of an original
• . . design of a useful article may secure the protection provided
by this Chapter ....
(b) For the purposes of this chapter(1)A "useful article" is an article which serves afunctional or utilitarianpurpose.
(2)The "design of a useful article" ..
consists of those characteristics of an article which make its appearance distinguishable
from an article performing the same or similarfunction, as perceived by an ordinary observer.6 9

DESIGNS NOT SUBJECT TO PROTECTION

SEC. 902. Protection under this Chapter shall not be available
for...
(d)the design of useful articles which necessarily assume their
particulardesign in order to perform their function.

Scope of Protection
SEC. 902.5 (a)An author or other proprietorwho secures design protection under this title has the right to exclude others
from applying or embodying the protected design on or in any article, useful or nonuseful.
TERM OF PROTECTION
SEC. 905. (a)Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the protection herein provided for a design shall continue for a term of ten
years from the date of the commencement of protection. . ., but if
a proper application for renewal is received by the Administrator
during the year prior to the expiration of the ten-year term, the
protection herein provided shall be extended for an additional period of five years from the date of expiration of the first ten years.
269. This proposal omits § 901(b)(3) of the design bill, supra note 9, and leaves §
901(b)(4) intact.
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How This ProposalProvides Effective Design Protection.-The
provisions of this proposal are intended to afford design protection to
articles that would not necessarily warrant design patent protection,
for lack of novelty or non-obviousness, 2 70 nor copyright protection,
71
due to the difficulty of applying the standards of copyrightability
This scheme would bridge the gap left by the two existing forms of
statutory coverage of the design area.
This proposal omits the word "ornamental" in the description of
the designs protected under this title.27 2 Because no such requirement is present in the copyright law, 27 3 and proposed design protection requirements possess copyright-type characteristics, 274 no "ornamentality" prerequisite should be attached to design protection.
The focal point of the design analysis under this proposal is on
the appearance of the article.275 The proposed test for protection of
the design is its overall effect on an average observer.278 If such a
person can perceive a distinguishable difference in appearance between an article with the design to be protected and one of comparable function, the design will warrant protection. This language attempts to present a more workable mode of analysis for design
protection than currently exists under the Copyright Act, and to ultimately widen the umbrella of legal protection. It allows for the protection of shape and form, such as that of the fixtures in Esquire, by
considering an article in its entirety, rather than in its component
parts. The proposal also contains built-in limitations to the extension
of design protection by prohibiting those designs that follow necessarily from the function of the useful article they adorn. This prevents
"back-door" protection of function, suitable only for patent protection, by means of protecting design. 2
270. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1976).
271. The copyrightability standards are those of separate identification and independent
existence. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981) (definition of "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works").
272. This refers to § 901(a) of the proposal.
273. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
274. Requirements of novelty or non-obviousness of design have not been included in the
proposed design legislation. See Design bill, supra note 9, §§ 901, 902.
275. This emphasis is manifested in § 901(b)(2) of my proposal.
276. See Id.
277. • One commentator has suggested extending copyright protection to all designs of
useful articles. See Note, supra note 41, at 253. Such an extension would allow for unwarranted protection of function for those articles whose designs are necessarily derived from their
functions.
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The maximum term of protection under this proposal is fifteen
years. This is longer than the coverage provided by the design bill,27 8
while still significantly shorter than the term of copyright protection. 27 9" This term will offer sufficient reward to designers as a means
of encouraging design creation for the general public good. It
promises an ample period of time in which a designer can capitalize
upon his or her efforts and still allows for free public use before the
design becomes obsolete.28 0
The proposed legislation attempts to facilitate readily accessible
design protection with sufficient coverage so as to adequately "promote the Progress of . . [the] useful Arts. 2 8 1 Its standards are
geared toward consistent judicial construction, as the courts attempt
to present a workable mode of analysis for designs in question.
CONCLUSION

Legal protection for the design of useful articles has lagged behind the protection afforded other creative works, including non-useful articles. Among the obstacles blocking fullscale design protection
are the practical problems plaguing the copyright system. There are
difficulties in identifying the design aspects of an article so as not to
protect its functional features, which are generally covered, if at all,
by mechanical patents. s2 Policy considerations can be conveniently
used to circumscribe the range of protected articles in order to prevent the protection of industrial designs. There are also problems
facing a potential design patentee, who must meet the relatively rigorous requirements of that scheme of protection." 3 When coupled
with the low success rate of design patents that are challenged in
court, these factors serve as barriers to expansive design protection.
Two alternatives are available to fill in the gap left by the current statutory schemes. One would involve judicial construction of
278.

The design bill provided for maximum protection of ten years. See Design bill,

supra note 9, § 905(a).
279. The term of copyright protection is the author's life plus fifty years, for works created on or after January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 255 and
accompanying text.
280. Although any proposed term of design protection will ultimately be an arbitrary
time period, other design protection schemes provide useful guidelines. England, for example,
offers a maximum fifteen-year term of design protection. See Registered Designs Act, 1949,
12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 88, § 8. The proposed term also comes within one year of the term of
domestic design patent protection. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
281. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
282. See supra notes 25, 77 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 15, 46-58 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:1043

existing statutes in an effort to develop workable standards for the
determination of often difficult design issues." 4 While this option offers expansion of design protection as a possibility, courts must still
grapple with the somewhat nebulous nature of the language used in
the statutes and the inherent difficulty of interpreting and applying
their principles.
Statutory protection seems to be a more attractive alternative
for providing design protection. If the guidelines established by statute are made sufficiently clear, judicial application becomes easier
and less haphazard. Such a scheme can also serve as an effective
indicator of legislative policy and thus remove the guesswork often
employed by courts in divining legislative intent.
The statutory scheme presented in this note28 5 strives to establish clear guidelines for design protection. Using the design bill 28 as
its foundation, it carves out the realm of protectible designs to its
logical limit: the point where articles lose the element of design
choice. Under this scheme, design protection is granted where it is
rightfully deserved and is withheld where protection must be secured
under other statutory schemes.
Steve W. Ackerman

284. See supra notes 201-21 and accompanying text.
285.

See supra text accompanying notes 268-70.

286.

Design bill, supra note 9.
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